In a recent child custody case in New York, a trial court judge was overturned, and custody was granted by DECISION & ORDER In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the father appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Stack, J.), dated October 16, 2007, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the mother custody of the parties' child, with visitation to him, and maintenance in the sum of $3,500 per month for five years. ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, (1) by deleting the provision thereof awarding the mother custody of the parties' child with visitation to the father, and substituting therefor a provision awarding custody of the parties' child to the father with visitation to the mother, (2) by deleting the provision thereof awarding the mother maintenance in the sum of $3,500 per month for five years, and substituting therefor a provision awarding the mother maintenance in the sum of $3,500 per month for five years or until the death of either party or the mother's remarriage, whichever shall occur sooner, and (3) by adding a provision thereto directing that the child shall not leave the United States without the prior knowledge and permission of both parents; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, to determine the issues of child support payable by the mother to the father and visitation in accordance herewith; and it is further, [*2] ORDERED that pending further proceedings in the Supreme Court to determine an appropriate visitation schedule of the child with the mother incident to the change of custody, the visitation schedule set forth in the judgment appealed from pertaining to school vacations, school breaks, weeknights, and state-recognized holidays shall now apply to the mother. The father's objections to certain of the Supreme Court's rulings are, for the most part, unpreserved for appellate review (see CPLR 4017, 5501[a]) and, in any event, are without merit, as the proffered evidence was either cumulative or irrelevant (see CPLR 2002; Matter of Kubista v Kubista, 11 AD3d 743; Laba v Laba, 281 AD2d 686; Stemmer v Stemmer, 182 AD2d 1120; Chumsky v Chumsky, 108 AD2d 714). There is "no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent" (Domestic Relations Law § 70[a]; § 240[1][a]; see Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d 89; Matter of Riccio v Riccio, 21 AD3d 1107). The essential consideration in making an award of custody is the best interests of the child (see Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d 89; Matter of McIver-Heyward v Heyward, 25 AD3d 556). "Factors to be considered include the quality of the home environment and the parental guidance the custodial parent provides for the child, the ability of each parent to provide for the child's emotional and intellectual development, the financial status and ability of each parent to provide for the child, the relative fitness of the respective parents, and the effect an award of custody to one parent might have on the child's relationship with the other parent'" (Kaplan v Kaplan, 21 AD3d 993, 994-995, quoting Miller v Pipia, 297 AD2d 362, 364). The Supreme Court properly identified the factors that were to be considered in rendering its custody determination. It also properly concluded that an award of sole custody to one parent, rather than joint custody to both parents, was in the best interests of the child given the level of acrimony between the parties and their inability to function together in a manner necessary for a joint arrangement (see Pambianchi v Goldberg, 35 AD3d 688, 689; Granata v Granata, 289 AD2d 527, 528). We find on this record, however, that the Supreme Court's award of custody to the mother lacks a sound and substantial basis and, therefore, must be set aside (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171; Schneider v Schneider, 40 AD3d 956). Although trial courts have the opportunity to assess the parties' credibility with reference to their character, temperament, and sincerity (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d at 171; Schneider v Schneider, 40 AD3d at 956), in matters of custody, the authority of the Appellate Division is as broad as that of the trial judge (see Matter of Louise E.S. v W. Stephen S., 64 NY2d 946, 947). Here, the Supreme Court gave insufficient attention to facts and evidence that, in our opinion, are of such significant collective magnitude as to warrant a custody determination in favor of the father. First, the Supreme Court found, with support in the record, that the mother, on at least one occasion, had filed false charges of physical abuse against the father. Indeed, the record was clear that the mother made numerous false charges against the father. There were four incidents of physical abuse accusations by the mother against the father, in August 2004, December 2004, January 2005, and December 2005. All of the Family Court petitions, when filed, apparently were withdrawn or dismissed. All of the mother's reports to child protective authorities were investigated and determined to be "unfounded." Moreover, expert medical testimony in the record strongly suggests that, regarding the [*3]January 2005 alleged incident, the mother manufactured proof of physical injury to herself. She admitted to the forensic examiner, and confirmed at trial, that the January 2005 incident of alleged physical abuse "might have been an accident." As a result of the January 2005 accusations, a temporary order of protection was issued against the father that prevented contact between the father and the child for approximately one month. The mother accused the father of having physically abused the child in December 2005 after a visitation exchange, and made a report to Child Protective Services. Records from Maimonides Hospital, where the child was examined the day after the exchange, found the child to be physically normal. The mother's manipulative conduct demonstrates a purposeful placement of her self-interest above the interests of others (see Cucinello v Cucinello, 234 AD2d 365). Indeed, evidence of false allegations of physical abuse which interfere with parental rights, is "so inconsistent with the best interests of the child that it raises, by itself, a strong probability that the offending party is unfit to act as a custodial parent" (Matter of Gago v Acevedo, 214 AD2d 565, 566; see also Nir v Nir, 172 AD2d 651, 652). By contrast, there is no evidence that any calls the father made to the police against the mother were baseless, and the Supreme Court made no such finding. The Supreme Court failed to attribute adequate significance to the determination that the mother had made at least one false claim, though the record evidences more than one such claim, and improperly equated that evidence with markedly less egregious conduct of the father. Second, the trial court erred in finding that the mother, rather than the father, would better foster the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent. While the parenting skills of both the mother and the father are subject to criticism, there is sufficient evidence from which to conclude that the father demonstrated an ability to foster post-divorce parent-child relationships, having done so with regard to his two older children from an earlier marriage. Moreover, a conclusion that the mother would more successfully foster a child/noncustodial parent relationship is insupportable, in light of her false allegations of physical abuse against the father. Third, the child's best interests are fostered by awarding custody to the father. Although overlooked by the Supreme Court, the father works from a home office and would be more readily available than the mother to meet the child's daily and immediate needs (cf. Del Papa v Del Papa, 172 AD2d 798, 799). Fourth, the judicial preference of keeping siblings together, where possible, in order to encourage close familial relationships, is firmly established (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 173). While there is clearly an age difference between the parties' child and his two half-siblings, the numerous benefits the child could derive from the development of a relationship with the older siblings should not have been summarily disregarded. Our custody determination, rather than being based upon the existence or absence of any one factor, is instead based upon our review of the evidence peculiar to this case relating to all of the relevant factors (id.; see Rupp-Elmasri v Elmasri, 305 AD2d 393; Miller v Pipia, 297 AD2d at 364). Contrary to the father's contention regarding the issue of maintenance, the Supreme Court set forth the factors that it considered in awarding maintenance and the reasons for its decision (see Hartog v Hartog, 85 NY2d 36, 50-51; Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][6][a]). The court's "failure [*4]to analyze each of the statutory maintenance factors [does] not alone warrant appellate alteration of the award" (Hartog v Hartog, 85 NY2d at 51; see Kudela v Kudela, 277 AD2d 1015, 1016). Taking these factors into consideration, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the mother maintenance in the sum of $3,500 per month for five years (see Meccariello v Meccariello, 46 AD3d 640; Kaplan v Kaplan, 21 AD3d 993). However, it erred in failing to include a provision that the award of maintenance shall terminate upon the death of either party or the mother's remarriage, whichever shall occur sooner (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][1][a]; Haines v Haines, 44 AD3d 901; Gold v Gold, 276 AD2d 587). LIFSON, J.P., MILLER, DILLON and ENG, JJ., concur. ENTER: James Edward Pelzer Clerk of the Court the appellate division to the father. It seemed clear from the record that the mother made false allegations of abuse and did not foster a relationship between the child and the father. However, the mother won the case at the trial level. After a review of the record, custody was granted to the father.

A-Rod's wife filed her divorce petition in Florida for a reason. In New York, as long as Alex has a pre marital agreement, his wife will only be entilteled to enforce the terms of the agreement. Since, A Rod got married after he signed his first mega contract, it is safe to assume that he has a valid pre nuptial agreement. All the hype about the divorce filed is good media. Nobody will benifit financially, and the only loser's are the children who will have to read or hear about thier father's conduct. Clearly, A-Rod's wife will get physical custody of the children. He is playing baseball all over the country for almost the entire year. Instead of trying to embarras her husband and thier children, she would of been better off having a private settlement his A-Rod and keeping this case out of the press. Nobody will win, and the public settlement will probably been the very simular to the one that could have been done privately. But then the lawyers would not get the publicity.

The Court of Appeals recently ruled that the proper valuation date for all marital property is the date the summons for divorce is filed. An older discontinued action shall not serve as the valuation date.Court of Appeals of New York. Solomon MESHOLAM, Respondent, v. Isabelle Helene MESHOLAM, Appellant. June 26, 2008 Glenn S. Koopersmith, for appellant. Charles E. Holster, III, for respondent. PIGOTT, J. The question is whether in this case the commencement of a prior, discontinued divorce action may serve as the valuation date for marital property for purposes of equitable distribution in a later divorce action. We hold that it may not. The parties were married in 1969. The wife commenced an action for divorce in 1994. The husband answered, but did not counterclaim for divorce. Five years later, following long and contentious pretrial proceedings, the wife moved for permission to discontinue the action. The husband opposed the motion, and cross-moved to amend his answer to assert a counterclaim for divorce. Supreme Court granted the wife's motion to discontinue the action and denied the husband's cross motion. Almost immediately, the husband commenced this action for divorce and ancillary relief. After finding that the husband was entitled to a divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment, Supreme Court held a bench trial to resolve disputed equitable distribution issues. Supreme Court held that the husband's pension must be valued as of the commencement date of the present action, rather than the commencement date of the wife's 1994 action. Relying on Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(4)(b), the court reasoned that it was precluded from selecting a valuation date earlier than the commencement of the pending action. The court further observed that there was no evidence of "wrongdoing or ill-motive" in the wife's election to discontinue the prior divorce action. After considering the duration of the marriage and the other statutory factors pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236(5)(d), Supreme Court determined that the marital property, including the marital portion of the pension, should be divided equally between the parties. The Appellate Division modified the judgment of divorce, in part, and otherwise affirmed, holding that Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in valuing the pension as of the commencement date of the present action. The court concluded that the "appropriate valuation date was the commencement date of the 1994 action" because there was "no evidence that the parties reconciled and continued to receive the benefits of the marital relationship after the prior action was commenced"(25 AD3d 670, 671 [2006] ). We now modify the order of the Appellate Division and remit the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings. Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(1)(c) defines marital property as all property acquired "during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action." Thus, in the absence of a separation agreement, the commencement date of a matrimonial action demarcates "the termination point for the further accrual of marital property" (Anglin v. Anglin, 80 N.Y.2d 553, 556 [1992] ). The definition of marital property "should be construed broadly in order to give effect to the 'economic partnership' concept of the marriage relationship recognized in the statute" (Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 15 [1986] ). Once property is classified as marital or separate, the trial court has broad discretion to select an "appropriate date for measuring the value of [the] property" (McSparron v. McSparron, 87 N.Y.2d 275, 287 [1995] ). However, the valuation date must be between "the date of commencement of the action [and] the date of trial" (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][4][b]). In determining whether the commencement of a particular "matrimonial action" terminates the accrual of marital property, we have looked to "the overall legislative intent of the Domestic Relations Law and ... the particular application of the equitable distribution regime" (Anglin, 80 N.Y.2d at 556). In Anglin, this Court held that the commencement of a separation action does not cut off the accrual of marital property because such an action "does not, ipso facto, terminate the marital economic partnership"(id. at 554). Rather, "[t]he economic partnership should be considered dissolved when a matrimonial action is commenced which seeks 'divorce, or the dissolution, annulment or declaration of the nullity of a marriage,' i.e., an action in which equitable distribution is available"(id. at 557, quoting Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5]). We observed that this rule "provides internal consistency and compatibility and objective verification, as opposed to uneven, ephemeral, personal interpretations as to when economic marital partnerships end"(id .). For similar reasons, we conclude that the value of marital property generally should not be determined by the commencement of an action for divorce that does not ultimately culminate in divorce. Equitable distribution is available "in an action wherein all or part of the relief granted is divorce" (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5]). Where there is no divorce, there can be no equitable distribution. Consequently, permitting the commencement date of the prior, unsuccessful divorce action to govern the valuation date of marital property for the purposes of a later, successful action in which equitable distribution is available would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme. In short, we hold today that courts must use the commencement date of the later, successful action as the earliest valuation date for marital property. However, the circumstances surrounding the commencement of the earlier action can and should "be considered as a factor by [the trial court], among other relevant factors, as [it] attempt[s] to calibrate the ultimate equitable distribution of marital economic partnership property acquired after the start of such an action by either spouse" (see Anglin, 80 N.Y.2d at 558). Here, as Supreme Court concluded, the pension benefits are marital property to the extent that they were earned prior to the commencement of the present divorce action (see Olivo v. Olivo, 82 N.Y.2d 202, 207 [1993]; Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 491 [1984]; see also Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law § 236, C236B:26, at 424 ["Pension rights are determined as of date of commencement of action since rights earned subsequently cannot be considered marital property"]). As a result, the marital portion of the pension could not be valued at any time earlier than the commencement date (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][4][b]). Accordingly, the judgment appealed from and the order of the Appellate Division brought up for review should be modified, with costs to defendant, and the matter remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed. Judgment appealed from and order of the Appellate Division brought up for review modified, with costs to defendant, by remitting to Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed. In Mesholam v Mesholam, 6/27/2008 NYLJ 30, (col. 1) the Court of Appeals, in an Opinion by Judge Pigott, held that the commencement of a prior, discontinued divorce action may not serve as the valuation date for marital property for purposes of equitable distribution in a later divorce action. Courts must use the commencement date of the later, successful action as the earliest valuation date for marital property. However, the circumstances surrounding the commencement of the earlier action can and should be considered as a factor by the trial court, among other relevant factors, as it attempts to calibrate the ultimate equitable distribution of marital economic partnership property acquired after the start of such an action by either spouse. The parties were married in 1969. The wife commenced an action for divorce in 1994. The husband answered, but did not counterclaim for divorce. Five years later the Supreme Court granted the wife's motion to discontinue the action. Almost immediately, the husband commenced this action for divorce. After finding that the husband was entitled to a divorce Supreme Court held that the husband's pension must be valued as of the commencement date of the present action, rather than the commencement date of the wife's 1994 action, relying on Domestic Relations Law §236(B)(4)(b). Supreme Court determined that the marital property, including the marital portion of the pension, should be divided equally between the parties. The Appellate Division held Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in valuing the pension as of the commencement date of the present action. It concluded that the 'appropriate valuation date was the commencement date of the 1994 action' because there was 'no evidence that the parties reconciled and continued to receive the benefits of the marital relationship after the prior action was commenced' (25 AD3d 670, 671 [2006]). The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings. It pointed out that Domestic Relations Law 236(B)(1)(c) defines marital property as all property acquired 'during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action.' Thus, in the absence of a separation agreement, the commencement date of a matrimonial action demarcates 'the termination point for the further accrual of marital property ' (citing Anglin v. Anglin, 80 NY2d 553, 556 [1992]). The Court held that the valuation date must be between 'the date of commencement of the action and the date of trial ' (Domestic Relations Law 236 [B][4][b]). In determining whether the commencement of a particular 'matrimonial action' terminates the accrual of marital property, it looked to 'the overall legislative intent of the Domestic Relations Law and the particular application of the equitable distribution regime. In Anglin, the Court held that the commencement of a separation action does not cut off the accrual of marital property because such an action does not, ipso facto, terminate the marital economic partnership. Rather, the economic partnership should be considered dissolved when a matrimonial action is commenced which seeks divorce, or the dissolution, annulment or declaration of the nullity of a marriage, i.e., an action in which equitable distribution is available. It observed that this rule provides internal consistency and compatibility and objective verification, as opposed to uneven, ephemeral, personal interpretations as to when economic marital partnerships end. For similar reasons, it concluded that the value of marital property generally should not be determined by the commencement of an action for divorce that does not ultimately culminate in divorce. Equitable distribution is available 'in an action wherein all or part of the relief granted is divorce. Where there is no divorce, there can be no equitable distribution. Consequently, permitting the commencement date of the prior, unsuccessful divorce action to govern the valuation date of marital property for the purposes of a later, successful action in which equitable distribution is available would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The Court found that, as Supreme Court concluded, the pension benefits were marital property to the extent that they were earned prior to the commencement of the present divorce action. As a result, the marital portion of the pension could not be valued at any time earlier than the commencement date.

The Court of Appeals recently ruled that the proper valuation date for all marital property is the date the summons for divorce is filed. An older discontinued action shall not serve as the valuation date. In Mesholam v Mesholam, 6/27/2008 NYLJ 30, (col. 1) the Court of Appeals, in an Opinion by Judge Pigott, held that the commencement of a prior, discontinued divorce action may not serve as the valuation date for marital property for purposes of equitable distribution in a later divorce action. Courts must use the commencement date of the later, successful action as the earliest valuation date for marital property. However, the circumstances surrounding the commencement of the earlier action can and should be considered as a factor by the trial court, among other relevant factors, as it attempts to calibrate the ultimate equitable distribution of marital economic partnership property acquired after the start of such an action by either spouse. The parties were married in 1969. The wife commenced an action for divorce in 1994. The husband answered, but did not counterclaim for divorce. Five years later the Supreme Court granted the wife's motion to discontinue the action. Almost immediately, the husband commenced this action for divorce. After finding that the husband was entitled to a divorce Supreme Court held that the husband's pension must be valued as of the commencement date of the present action, rather than the commencement date of the wife's 1994 action, relying on Domestic Relations Law §236(B)(4)(b). Supreme Court determined that the marital property, including the marital portion of the pension, should be divided equally between the parties. The Appellate Division held Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in valuing the pension as of the commencement date of the present action. It concluded that the 'appropriate valuation date was the commencement date of the 1994 action' because there was 'no evidence that the parties reconciled and continued to receive the benefits of the marital relationship after the prior action was commenced' (25 AD3d 670, 671 [2006]). The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings. It pointed out that Domestic Relations Law 236(B)(1)(c) defines marital property as all property acquired 'during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action.' Thus, in the absence of a separation agreement, the commencement date of a matrimonial action demarcates 'the termination point for the further accrual of marital property ' (citing Anglin v. Anglin, 80 NY2d 553, 556 [1992]). The Court held that the valuation date must be between 'the date of commencement of the action and the date of trial ' (Domestic Relations Law 236 [B][4][b]). In determining whether the commencement of a particular 'matrimonial action' terminates the accrual of marital property, it looked to 'the overall legislative intent of the Domestic Relations Law and the particular application of the equitable distribution regime. In Anglin, the Court held that the commencement of a separation action does not cut off the accrual of marital property because such an action does not, ipso facto, terminate the marital economic partnership. Rather, the economic partnership should be considered dissolved when a matrimonial action is commenced which seeks divorce, or the dissolution, annulment or declaration of the nullity of a marriage, i.e., an action in which equitable distribution is available. It observed that this rule provides internal consistency and compatibility and objective verification, as opposed to uneven, ephemeral, personal interpretations as to when economic marital partnerships end. For similar reasons, it concluded that the value of marital property generally should not be determined by the commencement of an action for divorce that does not ultimately culminate in divorce. Equitable distribution is available 'in an action wherein all or part of the relief granted is divorce. Where there is no divorce, there can be no equitable distribution. Consequently, permitting the commencement date of the prior, unsuccessful divorce action to govern the valuation date of marital property for the purposes of a later, successful action in which equitable distribution is available would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The Court found that, as Supreme Court concluded, the pension benefits were marital property to the extent that they were earned prior to the commencement of the present divorce action. As a result, the marital portion of the pension could not be valued at any time earlier than the commencement date.

In child custody and visitation cases there are several factors the courts will use to determine what is in "the best interests of the child". The parties are the primary source of information with regards to the weight the judge will give to each of these factors. However, due to the highly charged nature, and thus, skewed view of the facts, the courts do not rely solely on the parties' account of details the courts employ other entities and professionals to help them in this most delicate decision. So, for instance, to gain insight into the home environment of each of the parties, the courts will employ the Dept. of Probation, or its equivalent, to conduct a homestudy. A homestudy consists of an agency worker going out to each party's home to check for safety, habitability and adequacy of the home. The worker will check ther sleeping space, whether safe conditions exist, if there is adequate food, etc. The worker will also interview each occupant that lives in the home, in addition to the parent in an effort to get a insightful picture of how the child lives or would live if he or she were ordered to live or visit with either parent. Another major tool used in the child custody litigation is the forensics evaluation. Forensics is the utilization of a psychologist, psychiatrist or social worker to make an assessment and give testimony with respect to custody and visitation. The court will first determine if forensics is needed, which will be based on the particular circumstances of the case. This is crucial because without an expert's opinion, the court can make a determination about custody and visitation on information provided mainly by the parties, and other sources that do not supplant the parties' accounts accurately. Although the authority to order forensics examination is granted by Section 251 of the Family Court Act, caselaw indicates that that decision is within the sound discretion of the court. For example, where the court believes that there is no issue with respect to the emotional health or mental state of either parent or the child, it may rely on other evidence provided by the parties and their witnesses to make its ruling. So although either party may request that forensics be conducted, if the court is not convinced that this evidence is necessary in helping it to reach a custody or visitation determination, they may deny such a request. On the other hand, it has been held to be "reversible error" by the appellate courts, where the court refuses to order forensics where custody was changed/modified without a hearing, where there were patent issues of abuse, neglect, domestic violence or other psychological and emotional concerns, where there was parental alienation or where the child resists visitation (without justification). In any of these circumstances either party, by his or her attorney, and the attorney for the child (the law guardian) may request forensics either orally or formally (by motion). The latter method is preferred, this way, if the court still denies the request there is a record for appeal. Even in cases where an expert conducts an evaluation, his or her recommendation is not determinative of who will be awarded custody or if visitation will be granted. The opinion of the expert is, in essence, but one factor of many to consider in the court's decision as to what is in the best interest of the child. The court will typically use the information gathered by the expert to help it to get a more comprehensive picture of all of the circumstances in the case, not to allow the expert to make the ultimate decision. The evaluation typically involves an interview with each party, an interview with the child, an observation of the child with each parent, contacting the school, physicians, treatwing mental health experts, family, friends and other relevant players in the child's life. He or she will also, administer psychological testing to either or both parents, and in some instances the child. Furthermore, some will make home visits and make other visits deemed necessary to make a more complete assessment. The expert chosen to conduct the evaluation will be based on issues or concerns raised by either parent and/or the attorney for the child. So for instance, in a case where the attorney for the child believes that there are some alienation issues, a psychologist may be employed to do the evaluation. If the custody or visitation case is more of just a "fit vs. fit" test, a social worker may be suitable to conduct the evaluation. The evaluation may take up to several weeks, and some cases, several months to complete for a number of reasons. The interviews may need several sessions to accommodate all parties' schedule, the testing may need time to conduct and complete, interviewing the collateral contacts, i.e. family, friends, etc. may be time consuming. In fact, it is not uncommon for more than one evaluation to be conducted if the custody litigation takes several years, which is does occasionally occur. It is because of this reason that some courts wish to forego forensics, their rationale being that prolonging child custody or visitation cases only serves to perpetuate conflict within families. However, some courts merely want to expedite the process in an effort to address more protracted cases. In any case, where either parent is insistent that some serious concerns be uncovered, confirmed, explored it is advisable to implore the court to have forensics done. Although the costs for these evaluations may be bourne by either or both parties, it can be deal closer for the parent who really wants to highlight the inability or instability of the other parent being a nurturing or loving parent.